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INTRODUCTION
In our information age, intellectual property is a fundamental busi-
ness asset protected under three basic bodies of law: trademark, patent, and
*Professor of Law, University of Toledo. B.A., 1964, University of Texas; M.A., 1967,
University of Illinois; J.D., 1971, University of Texas College of Law; LL.M, 1977, New York
University.
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copyright. Trademark law' prohibits product imitators from passing off
their goods as those of another. Patent law2 provides a limited monopoly
for new and inventive products and processes. Copyright law3 protects a
broad range of artistic, literary, and musical works of authorship. Other
bodies of law protect forms of information that do not conveniently fit into
the traditional domain of trademark, patent, and copyright law.4
In its progressive shift to an information-based economy, the United
States has become increasingly vulnerable to piracy,5 expropriation, and
otherwise inadequate protection of its intellectual property in certain
foreign countries. These "problem" countries are found mostly in the
Third World, where trademark, patent, and copyright protection is, from a
U.S. standpoint, either inadequate or ignored.
Examples are plentiful. Pharmaceutical companies producing innova-
tive drugs at great expense often find their new products imitated quickly
and with impunity in certain developing countries; computer software
firms have lost billions of dollars from the piracy of their programs in these
same countries. Similarly, certain developing countries have not adequately
enforced their trademark laws against those marketing counterfeit goods,
many of which not only are sold in the pirate country, but also make their
way into the U.S. market. The loss is large even if one takes into account the
probability that the available economic data may magnify the injury to the
U.S. economy.6 Recent government and industry studies have valued yearly
losses from counterfeiters at billions of dollars, 7 resulting in thousands of
1. For a discussion of trademark law, see infra text accompanying notes 47-56.
2. For a discussion of patent law, see infra text accompanying notes 57-63.
3. For a discussion of copyright law, see infra text accompanying notes 64-68.
4. The two principle bodies of law are trade secret law and the protection of semicon-
ductor chip:;. Semiconductor Chip Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914. The term "intellectual
property," as used in this article, refers to the broadest range of subject matter, including trade
secrets and semiconductor chips. In the United States, trade secrets generally are protected
under state law. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act §§ 1-12 (1979) (state trade secrets law adopted
by fifteen states).
5. The term "piracy" has no settled meaning in international law. It is used here in its
broadest sense to connote intentional and systematic misappropriation of intellectual prop-
erty. The term "pirate nation" refers to a country where organized piracy occurs. These
countries either tolerate or encourage piracy or do not enforce the law satisfactorily. I have
used the term "problem nation" to connote those countries in which intellectual property laws
do not confer an adequate level of protection. The term "counterfeiting," as in counterfeit
goods, refers to the practice of passing off and false labeling. For a cogent discussion of this
terminology, see Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and
Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 747, 770-80 (1989).
6. Calculation of loss is a highly speculative undertaking and any statistics on this matter
should be viewed with skepticism. The principle reason for the measurement difficulty is that
losses to enterprises in industrialized countries take the form of lost revenue opportunities.
The calculaion of such losses, therefore, requires the assumption of unaffected revenues. See
U.S. Trade Representative, 1989 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers
2-4 (1989) [hereinafter USTR Rep.]; see also Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third
World: Intellectual Property Negotiation in the GAIT Multinational Framework, 22 Vand.J.
Transnat'l L. 689, 699 (1989).
7. Some estimates of loss to the U.S. economy are as high as $23.8 billion. Losses
constitute about five percent of the U.S. trade deficit. See United States Int'l Trade Comm'n
Pub. No. 2065, Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect on U.S.
Trade 4-2 (Feb. 1985) [hereinafter United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, Foreign Protection].
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lostjobs.8 From the U.S. perspective, international protection of intellectual
property has become an important trade issue in an era when the United
States has suffered balance of trade and budget deficits.9
The "piracy" problem has emerged because of changing patterns of
trade and technology. Intellectual property has become a major component
of international trade' 0 and U.S. competitiveness. Production of intellectual
products has become increasingly expensive. Today's research and devel-
opment costs require large-scale production, open international markets,
and protection against free-riding imitators to recoup costs of production.I
Unfortunately for the creators and proprietors of intellectual products, new
reproductive technologies 12 have lowered copying costs while raising the
costs of legal enforcement.
These changing patterns of trade and technology have produced a
schism between the West and the developing world in their respective
attitudes toward the protection of intellectual property. As consumers of
intellectual property, certain Third World countries see little to gain from
vigorously protecting intellectual property licensed to them from the West.
Their interests in weak protection have a rational basis. The developing
world needs maximum access to Western intellectual goods for its devel-
opment and views stringent standards of protection as debilitating. From
the standpoint of the West, Third World countries not only provide
insufficient protection under the substantive law but often inadequately
enforce whatever legal standards do exist. For the West, organized piracy,
with the help of new reproductive technologies, threatens to undermine the
incentive structure that trademark, patent, and copyright laws'are designed
to, promote. Those incentives are eroded by a thriving parallel market of
counterfeited and pirated goods.
U.S. companies traditionally have looked to basic international treaties
as a remedy against the piracy of their intellectual property. To an owner
of intellectual property, however, these treaties fall short of providing
effective protection because they lack the power to enforce rights or to
8. One report estimated that 131,000 jobs in five industry sectors were lost in 1982 due
to foreign product counterfeiting. See United States Int'l Trade Comm'n Pub. No. 1479, XVII
Effects of Foreign Product Counterfeiting on U.S. Industry 4-13 (Jan. 1984). For an overview
of the piracy issue, see Hoffman, Marcou & Murray, Commercial Piracy of Intellectual
Property, 71 J. Pat. Trademark Off. Soc'y 556 (1989).
9. For key studies of the international dimension of intellectual property and U.S. policy
in the face of organized piracy, see R. Benko, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Issues
and Controversies (1987); Intellectual Property Rights: Global Consensus, Global Conflict? (R.
Gadbaw & T. Richards eds. 1988)[hereinafter R. Gadbaw & T. Richards]; H. Stalson,
Intellectual Property Rights and U.S. Competitiveness in Trade (1987); Council for Interna-
tional Business, A New MTN: Priorities For Intellectual Property (1985); U.S. General
Accounting Office, Strengthening World Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (1987)
[hereinafter GAO Report].
10. The internationalization of intellectual property is manifested by a constant increase in
the number of foreign patent applications of intellectual property rights worldwide.
11. See G. Bertin & S. Wyatt, Multinationals and Industrial Property: The Control of the
World's Technology 127 (1988).
12. Reproductive technologies are those that permit the copying, storing, and retrieving of
information. New reproductive technologies encompass photocopy machines, VCRs, and
computer systems. These technologies improve all the time.
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settle disputes. The Berne Convention13 sets minimum levels of copyright
protection that member nations must provide, but it has not proven to be
effective against systematic large-scale piracy in Third World countries.1 4
Similarly, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
which protects trademarks and patents, 15 does not specify minimum
standards for acquiring and enforcing intellectual property rights and is
thereby limited in its effectiveness.' 6 Worldwide protection of U.S. intel-
lectual property will remain inadequate even though Congress recently has
passed important trade-based legislation 17 and has reformed U.S. law,
enabling the United States to adhere to the Berne Convention.' 8 The
general consensus in the United States is that an effective remedy against
the vulnerability of its intellectual property must be sought through a new
mechanism.
The new General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") round
has been proposed as the innovative solution to remedy this perceived
deficiency in the international protection of intellectual property.19 The
GATT is an international arrangement that includes over ninety countries
participating in multilateral trade negotiations involving ways to encourage
13. For a discussion of the Berne Convention, see infra text accompanying notes 94-98.
14. The Universal Copyright Convention has been even less effective and is administered
by UNESCO, a UN agency from which the United States has withdrawn.
15. The Paris Convention came into being in 1883 to cover patents, trademarks, trade
names, utility models, industrial designs, appellations of origin, and repression of unfair
competition. For a discussion of international treaties, see infra text accompanying notes
89-102.
16. The international conventions are based on national treatment and impose certain
minimum conditions for protection. See infra text accompanying note 97; see also International
Treaties on Intellectual Property 1-14 (M. Leaffer ed. 1990).
17. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Star.
1107 (1988).
18. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-538, 102 Stat.
2717 (1988).
19. See U.S., Japanese, European Groups Call for GATT Intellectual Property Code, 36
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 209 (June 6, 1988) (three business groups from the
United Stat.s, Japan and European Community ("EC") have offered a proposed code to deal
with intellectual property); ITC Study on Intellectual Property Protection Supports U.S.
GATT Position, 35 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 347-48 (Mar. 3, 1988) (U.S. film
industry suffers ,43-61 billion per year in losses due to piracy of intellectual property by
foreign countries, which the U.S. intends to change through GATT negotiations at the
Uruguay Round); U.S. Intellectual Property Proposal is Proposed to GATT Negotiating
Group, 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 655 (Oct. 29, 1987) (in an effort to
standardize world intellectual property law, the GAT has identified several areas and
recommend!; establishing a dispute settlement mechanism); Intellectual Property to be
Included on GATT Agenda, 32 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 571 (Sept. 25, 1986)
(ministers from 74 GATT countries agreed to discuss intellectual property in the next round
of talks). Bur see Developing Nations Insist That GATT Isn't Place to Discuss Counterfeiting,
30 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 111 (May 30, 1988) (India and Brazil argue that
counterfeiting should be addressed by the Paris Convention, while the United States, Japan,
and the EC argue that the GATT should rule since the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") does not have the resources or countries to enforce regulations);
GAT Delegates Receive Detailed EC Intellectual Property Proposal, 36 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) 278 (July 14, 1988) (under the EC proposal all GATT countries would
adhere to the Paris and Berne Conventions).
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free trade among nations.20 The latest round of GATT negotiations, the
Uruguay Round, has placed intellectual property prominently on the
agenda.2 1
Why is the inadequate protection of intellectual property an important
free trade issue? Inadequate protection of intellectual property undermines
the goal of free trade because it leads to trade distortions.22 Absent
sufficient protection, creators can no longer recover the cost of their
investment in research and development, resulting in lower production,
fewer trading opportunities, and higher costs to the consumer.23 As a
result, intellectual property protection has become a major trade issue, and
the GA'IT appears to offer a practical structure that promotes quicker and
more effective protection for U.S. intellectual property than is provided by
the existing international conventions.
The current proposal, called "Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property" ("TRIPS"), incorporates minimum world standards for the
protection of intellectual property as a part of the GATT.24 The TRIPS
proposals have been embraced enthusiastically by the United States and
other developed countries but much less so, not surprisingly, by the Third
World. So far, both groups have maintained irreconcilable positions on the
subject.
20. GATT] refers to both an international institution concerned with trade between
nations and a legal document of the same name. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted
in 4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents
(1969); see also K. Simmonds & B. Hill, Law and Practice Under the GATT (1988); see generally
K. Dam, The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization 3 (1970) (GATT as a
legal international instrument that articulates rules and duties for its signatories); State
Department Program Examines "GATT and Intellectual Property," 31 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) 497-98 (Apr. 10, 1986) (program focused on methods of improving
foreign protection of U.S. intellectual property rights). For a general overview of the GATT,
see J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT (1969).
21. Article XX(d) of the GATT has placed the protection of intellectual property among
the exceptions to the agreement. See K. Simmonds & B. Hill, supra note 20, § I.A.
22. See Intellectual Property and Trade: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 51-53. (1986) (statement of Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Asst. U.S. Trade Representative for
Trade Policy and Analysis) [hereinafter Hearings].
23. See Keon, TRIPS in the Current GATT Negotiations, Les Nouvelles 203 (April 1988).
For an economic model of the effects of counterfeit sales on output, total revenue, and profits
of legitimate producers, see United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, Foreign Protection, supra note
7.
24. The TRIPS negotiating mandate reads:
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade, and
taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of
intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the
negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new
rules and disciplines.
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of principles, rules and
disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods, taking into account
work already undertaken in GATT.
Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration, in Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment,
and Trade in Services in the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations, 23 Stan. J. Int'l. L. 57,
59 (1987).
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This Article examines Third World attitudes toward the protection of
industrial and artistic property and reviews the various methods by which
private parties and governments have tried to curtail the growing incidence
of piracy in the problem countries. My general thesis is that the ultimate
goal of the United States-as well as all proprietor nations who sell
intellectual property to consuming nations in the Third World-should be
the adequate protection of intellectual property based on international
standards. Further, these standards should be enforced with the aid of the
GATT. This should be a long-term goal, however, and should take into
account the countervailing interests of the developing nations whose
exigent economic interests differ from those of the West.
A durable agreement must be based on mutual gain and cannot be
imposed by the information-producing countries on the developing world.
Unless the interests of the information-consuming nations (the developing
countries) are considered seriously, a long-run solution to the problem will
not occur. In sum, the major players in the GATT negotiations must begin
to focus on an agreement that promises mutual gain.
Part I of this Article 25 examines the incidence of intellectual property
piracy and reviews the results of inadequate intellectual property protec-
tion. It also considers the attitudes of the developing countries about
intellectual property protection, showing that less stringent standards of
legal protection in the developing world are based on a perfectly rational
interest in economic development.
Part 1126 reviews the current state of the international treaties on
trademarks, patents, and copyrights as a means of effectively protecting
U.S. intellectual property interests. It examines other approaches to
international protection such as relief against infringing importation under
section 337 of the Tariff Act and the bilateral approach of section 301 of the
Trade Act. Because relief under these two bodies of law suffers from
various limitations, a multinational trade-based approach to the piracy
question is proposed as the favored solution.
Part 11127 provides an overview of the GATT as it relates to the
integration of intellectual property protection into the GATT framework.
This part considers the debate taking place in the current Uruguay Round
negotiations concerning the possibility of a TRIPS agreement2 8 .within the
GATT system. This Article concludes that a "new multilateralism" must be
incorporated into a TRIPS agreement. To be effective, a TRIPS agreement
must reconcile the needs of both proprietor nations of the West and the
consuming countries of the developing world. This will call for patience
and flexibility on the part of the West, which will have to consider the
special needs and different cultures of the developing world.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 29-68.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 69-123.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 124-63.
28. See U.S. Proposal for Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 667 (Oct. 10, 1987).
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I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GENERAL AND THE WORLDWIDE PIRACY
PROBLEM
A. What is Intellectual Property?
Intellectual property law confers property rights on certain forms of
information.2 9 In general, trademark law confers rights on symbolic
information," patent law on scientific information,31 and copyright law on
expressive information.3 2 Because of its intangible nature, intellectual
property differs from the more familiar tangible property. When we think
of property, we usually think of land or our personal belongings, things
that occupy space and can be consumed. By comparison, intangible
property, for example a product of the mind such as a piece of music or a
way of making steel, does not have a tangible existence.33 The intangible
nature of intellectual property leads to special difficulties of protection.
Once information is created and published, it is difficult to ptevent others
from using it. Without effective enforcement of trademark, patent, and
copyright laws, creators will not invest sufficiently in the production of new
information. 34
29. See generally Ropski & Kline, A Primer on Intellectual Property Rights: The Basics of
Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, Trade Secrets, and Related Rights, 50 Alb. L. Rev. 405
(1986) (overview of intellectual property law).
30. Trademark law protects words, names, symbols, and devices that distinguish goods
and services from other, similar goods and services. In the United States, trademark rights are
acquired upon use of the mark. In many other countries, trademark rights are established by
registration. Infringement of trademark occurs when a third party uses a mark on the same or
similar goods or services when the consumer would be confused about the origin of these
goods or services.
31. Patent law confers property rights on new, useful, and nonobvious processes and
products. It excludes others from making, using, or selling the patented invention for
seventeen years. Patent law provides a more exclusive monopoly than copyright law. Patent
protection extends to functional features of products and encompasses ideas to the extent that
the ideas are inextricably embodied in the product or process. Unlike a copyright or
trademark, a patent is much more difficult to obtain. To be patented, an invention must not
only be new and original, but it must also be an improvement over the prior art such that one
with ordinary skill in that art could not consider the invention obvious. For the general
requirements of patentability, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1984).
32. Copyright law protects original expression. It does not extend to the ideas that the
creator expresses. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976). Nor does copyright protect expression when the
idea and expression have merged. See M. Leaffer, Understanding Copyright Law §§ 2.12-.13
(1989). The Semiconductor Chip Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914, is a hybrid of patent and
copyright law. The Act protects original mask works. See infra note 68. Under this Act, the
functional aspects of the product are protected as in patent law, but, unlike patent law, the Act
does not base protection on novelty.
33. Of course, the intellectual creation may be embodied in a variety of tangible media. A
chemical process may be written on a piece of paper, a melody recorded on a cassette, or a
trade symbol affixed to a good. One must always make the distinction between the information
(the intellectual property) and the material object to which it is affixed. A book can be burned,
but the information in it cannot be destroyed.
34. There are alternative ways to encourage production of intellectual property, such as
direct governmental production or governmental subsidy. However, history suggests the
superiority of a private market proprietary approach nurtured by intellectual property law. See
generally D. Carlton & J. Perlott, Modern Industrial Organization 653-93 (1990) (concluding
that a blend of competition and monopoly, created by patent law protection, is the best way to
encourage continued technological innovation).
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If protection is inadequate, the creator of information cannot compete
with a third party user who has borne none of the investment costs in
creating the information. On the international level, the damages to the
owner are compounded when the pirated work is exported to other nations
and sold for less than that of the original creator's work.
The incidence of piracy, both in the United States and abroad, has
increased exponentially in the past decade.3 5 This trend will continue in
large part because reproductive technologies have improved and become
cost efficient, and the gap between the creation costs and reproduction costs
has increased. More than ever, the creator of information is placed at a
severe disadvantage to the unlicensed user. A sophisticated computer
program, for example, may cost thousands of dollars to produce, but can be
copied at a fraction of the cost. A new family of integrated circuits may cost
one hundred million dollars to design and less than one million dollars to
copy.8 6 As for computer software, one can find a sophisticated computer
program Eelling for $7.50 in the Far East that is sold in the United States for
$500. Unfortunately, it costs as much as ever to create an innovative
pharmaceutical product, a piece of music, or to develop goodwill under a
brand name. Thus, to encourage the continuing production of informa-
tion, the law must provide an adequate level of protection for intellectual
creations. :37
Intellectual property protection provides an example of a classic
economic tradeoff. Trademark, patent, and copyright laws undermine
consumer welfare because they impede the dissemination of information.
Intellectual property laws grant limited monopolies on intellectual cre-
ations and, in the short run, a consumer must pay more for the use of
information protected by the trademark, patent, and copyright laws.
Because the owner of a trademark, patent, or copyright can charge a higher
price for the use of an intellectual creation, access to this information is
curtailed to the detriment of consumers.38
35. See R. Benko, supra note 9, at 51.
36. See Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property: Statement of Views
of the European, Japanese and United States Business Communities, Joint Report by the
Intellectual Property Committee, Washington D.C./Keidanren, TokyolUnion of Industrial
and Employers' Confederations of Europe, Brussels (June 1988) [hereinafter Basic Frame-
work]. Of the two billion records and tapes sold in the world, 25% are counterfeit, with prices
in some countries as low as 25% of the price of the genuine product. Id. at 25.
37. The magnitude of the loss is great. Losses are estimated for U.S. companies at $20
billion a year, U.S. auto parts at $3 billion, the motion picture industry at $1 billion, and the
apparel and shoe industry at $1 billion. Approximately 131,000 U.S. jobs have been lost
because of trademark infringement. In 1986, 750,000jobs were lost due to infringment. Some
100,000 jobs were lost in Europe. Global job loss was estimated at 1,500,000. See Concerted
International Action Urged to Drive Counterfeiters Out of Business, 33 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) 42 (Nov. 13, 1986); see also Gorlin, Strategy and Considerations in
Expanding The Markets Outside the United States: An Overview, Albany Conference on
Intellectual Property, § 3.02(1) (1989).
38. Despite the loss of consumer welfare, the economic literature tends to support the idea
that a net positive welfare effect results from intellectual property protection. For a study of
the patent system, see F. Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System Study No. 15 of
the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights 21 (1958); for a model of
the copyright system, see Novos & Waldman, The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection:
An Analytic Approach, 92 J. Pol. Econ. 236 (1984).
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Another significant cost that the protection of intellectual property
imposes on the public is administrative. The patent system, which requires
a body of technically trained personnel, is a prime example. Western
countries, whose information industries are mature and whose foreign
trade is heavily dependent on exporting information, can justify imposing
these costs on the public. It is hardly surprising that Third World countries
see little advantage in developing an elaborate and costly administrative
mechanism to enforce the protection of intellectual property of foreign
transnational companies.
As consumers of intellectual property produced in the West, develop-
ing countries do not perceive the need for strong protection to provide an
incentive to create. The developing countries, however, desperately need
access to these intellectual products for their economic development. This
has led to a lukewarm attitude toward the enforcement of intellectual
property law and has provided a fertile setting for the piracy of intellectual
property.3 9 The result is a collision course with the West. The developing
world and the West have widely varying positions that must be reconciled,
if possible, by an innovative multilateral solution that takes into account the
pressing needs of the developing world.
B. Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries
1. In General
Transfer of technology by the licensing of information constitutes an
ever growing part of world trade. Such commerce has become the lifeblood
of the U.S. economy and a bright spot in an otherwise unfavorable balance
of trade. Whether one considers movies, music, computer software, or
chemical processes, the United States continues to be among the world's
largest producers (if not the largest) of new and valuable information.40
Indeed, all Western developed countries are information-rich and receive
billions of dollars in foreign exchange from the information-poor develop-
ing countries. It is not surprising that certain developing countries have less
of a protectionist attitude toward intellectual property, a resource to which
they sorely need access. 41
The inadequate protection of intellectual property in developing
countries can be viewed at two levels: the meager or nonexistent govern-
mental enforcement of the law and the deficient coverage of intellectual
property in the law itself. Although some countries have satisfactory
39. For this argument, see Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright
in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970).
40. Accurate figures are impossible to locate. Some claim that the United States has been
for some time the world's largest exporter of copyrighted works. The export value of U.S.
motion pictures now exceeds the value of our steel imports. See U.S. Adherence to the Berne
Convention: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1987) (statement of Senator PatrickJ.
Leahy).
41. Basic problem countries include Argentina, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Mexico, Brazil,
Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia. See USTR Rep., supra note 6, at
viii-xiii; R. Gadbaw & T. Richards, supra note 9, at 14.
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coverage in their substantive laws, the governments fall far short of
adequately enforcing those laws. Weak enforcement can take the form of
administrative delays which in effect discriminate against foreign litigants.
Inadequate substantive protection can be seen in the following overview of
trademark, patent, and copyright law in the developing countries. 42
A lax attitude in protecting intellectual property offers, at least in the
short run, attractive benefits for pirates and consuming nations. Pirates of
intellectual property enjoy lower production costs and are in a better
position than legitimate producers to satisfy demands in developing coun-
tries. Pirates can do so because they merely copy products rather than
develop their own and pay no royalties to the owner or creator. By copying
only successful products, the pirate avoids the risk of market failure.
Barring effective regulation, the piracy of intellectual property pays
off because it involves little risk and provides a healthy return on invest-
ment. Pirates enrich themselves and, in the short run, the countries in
which they operate. Through piracy, developing countries can procure
needed goods and services at little cost, while industries that specialize in
producing counterfeit goods employ thousands of workers. When com-
pared to these tangible gains, the threat that investment from Western
countries might be withdrawn is secondary to immediate development
needs.
In Third World countries, the piracy of intellectual property is
justified by an ideology of development. Ready access to intellectual
property is viewed as important to development, whereas the enforcement
of intellectual property law is considered a burden on development. Thus,
developing countries resist allocating scarce government resources to the
enforcement of intellectual property rights.43 As with the importation of
capital, the importation of intellectual property often is viewed as a tool to
dominate and exploit the economic potential of the importing countries.
Paying for imports or making royalty payments imposes economic burdens
and fosters a negative balance of trade.
In addition to this ideology, developing countries provide weak or
nonexistent protection for, perhaps, a more basic reason. Intellectual
property is simply too new of a concept to have developed a tradition of
legal protection. Unlike Western countries, developing countries have few
strong lobbies of inventors, authors, or companies that benefit from strong
intellectual property laws.
Despite a pervasive hostility toward strong intellectual property pro-
tection, some developing countries are beginning to see the value of
stronger protection. 4 A change in basic attitudes, however, will not occur
42. See infra text accompanying notes 47-68.
43. The prime example of developing countries' attitudes toward intellectual property is
represented by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, known as
UNCTAD. Created in 1964, UNCTAD has been primarily involved in intellectual property.
Its various pcsition papers reflect the developing countries' concern about access to innovative
and creative works originating in developed countries. For a discussion of UNCTAD, see
Spitals, The UNCTAD Report on the Role of Trademarks in Developing Countries: An
Analysis, 3 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l Comp. L. 369 (1981).
44. See Yamaguchi, Remarks, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 22 Vand. J.
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quickly. The United States and other countries, as well as many business
associations, have vigorously touted to developing countries the benefits of
adopting Western standards for protecting intellectual property. 45 Their
arguments have a hollow, self-serving ring to them, especially when
developing countries have to pay the bill for protecting the rights of
foreigners at the expense of the indigenous population. Although the
benefits of strong protection may be apparent in the long run, to many in
the developing world the benefits of weak protection appear to outweigh
the costs. At best, the proposed benefits are unclear.4 6
Nonetheless, one can perceive a change in perspective. The origin of
this change can be traced to both local firms and consumers, themselves
victimized by unrestrained piracy in two ways. First, some local companies
are owners of indigenously developed intellectual property and suffer
along with Western companies from inadequate legal protection. Piracy
deprives these local businesses of sales and the ability to provide employ-
ment, and it discourages local companies from engaging in their own
research and development. Second, absent adequate protection, Western
firms will less readily transfer technology to local companies. Such direct
foreign investment is vital to development because it disseminates state-of-
the-art technology into the economy.
Consumers in developing countries also are directly victimized by
counterfeit goods that threaten the public health and welfare in these
countries. These inferior and sometimes dangerous products are sold
widely to Third World consumers, who are vulnerable because of lax
government enforcement.
Despite these persuasive arguments for vigorous enforcement of
Western standards of intellectual property protection, the developing
Transnat'l L. 325, 326 (1989). Some newly industrialized nations have shown a readiness to
change to Western standards, particularly in the face of bilateral pressure. South Korea,
Taiwan, and Singapore are some prime examples.
45. See J. MacLaughlin, T. Richards & L. Kenny, The Economic Significance of Piracy, in
R. Gadbaw & T. Richards, supra note 9, at 89 (in seven countries surveyed, merely
infinitesimal increases in economic growth rates are required to offset any short-term loss in
economic activity from establishing intellectual property rights); Strong Intellectual Property
Protection Benefits the Developing Countries, Intellectual Property Committee (USA),
Keidanren (Japan), UNICE (Europe) (Apr. 19, 1989) (strong intellectual property protection
produces long-run benefits by stimulating innovation, providing lower cost methods of
production and distribution, producing better and safer products, creating more jobs and a
more skilled labor force, encouraging investment, and creating an infrastructure designed to
reward creative talent, whereas free riding and imitation condemn a country to perpetual
second-class status); G. Hoffman, Curbing International Piracy of Intellectual Property 14
(1989) ("By allowing technological piracy, developing countries do not provide the incentives
for indigenous innovation but rather stifle it and foster the 'brain drain' of their most able
innovators"); see also Burstein, Diffusion of Knowledge-Based Products: Applications to
Developing Economies, 22 Econ. Inquiry 612-18 (1984) (enhanced patent protection encour-
ages development).
46. See Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property, 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 243,
257-60 (1989). Professor Braga sums up possible costs and benefits of strong intellectual
property protection in the Third World. He concludes that the impact of enhanced protection
may vary greatly among different countries. "Mhere is no a priori strong evidence that these
countries will necessarily benefit or lose from a reform of their intellectual property systems."
Id. at 264.
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world exists in a dramatically different cultural and economic environment.
The following overview examines trademark, patent, and copyright pro-
tection in the developing world and the policies that have led to the tension
between developing countries and the West.
2. Trademarks
Virtually every major producer of brand name clothing, shoes, jew-
elry, agricultural chemicals, and pharmaceuticals has been victimized by
organized piracy and inadequate protection under trademark law in
various Third World countries. 47 In many of those markets, trademarked
goods are counterfeited overtly. Many of these counterfeit goods make
their way into the United States and other foreign markets.
Some developing countries have displayed hostility toward trademark
protection in their substantive law. This attitude is nurtured by a fear that
foreign licensors of trademarks exploit both local businesses and vulnerable
consumers. Foreign licensors are perceived as having superior bargaining
power, permitting them to impose terms unfavorable to the local licensee. 48
In addition to potentially onerous terms in the licensing contract, local
authorities believe that the increased use of trademarks will become an
insurmountable obstacle to achieving economic self-sufficiency. According
to this theory, the public's dependence on products identified by foreign
trademarks makes it difficult for local producers to establish recognition for
their own goods. This position is supported by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD").49
Some claim that consumers in developing countries are exploited by
entrenched brand names. They argue that the foreign trademarks encour-
age irrational preferences among vulnerable, largely illiterate consumers in
the developing countries. The foreign trademark functions as an insidious
vehicle for persuasive advertising, which modifies healthy consumption
patterns.0
A proposed Mexican law provides a good example of an attempt to
curtail the effect of foreign trademarks. In 1976, Mexico passed a law that
required the local linking of trademarks.-5 The Mexican "linking law,"
47. A notorious example is the Republic of Korea, which until recently had no effective
body of law to protect intellectual property at all. Through pressure by the United States,
Korea passed trademark, patent, and copyright laws in 1987 and 1988. In the area of
trademark, a foreigner, in principle, is protected if registered in Korea. Foreign countries
moved quickly to avail the mselves of the law. But enforcement of the law is either lax or
nonexistent. As a result, overt infringement is rife. See Darlin, Where Trademarks Are Up for
Grabs: U.S. Products Widely Copied in South Korea, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1989, at B1, col. 3.
48. See Cornish & Phillips, The Economic Function of Trade, Marks: An Analysis With
Special Reference to Developing Countries, 13 Int'I Rev. Indus. Prop. Copyright L. (IIC) 41,
56 (1982).
49. Established in 1964 as a permanent organ of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, UNCTAD was given the responsibility of establishing principles concerning trade
between industrialized nations and developing countries. See Ball, Attitudes of Developing
Countries to Trademarks, 74 Trade-mark Rep. 160, 162 n.8 (1983).
50. Spitals, supra note 43, at 380.
51. See Note, Intellectual Property, Trade and .Technology TransferLaw: The United
States and Mexico, 7 B.C. Third World L. Rev. 277 (1987).
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which has never gone into effect (due in part to foreign outcry),52 would
have forced the use of foreign trademarks in connection with domestic
trademarks. It mandated that all foreign trademarks used in connection
with goods produced in Mexico would have to be associated with a Mexican
mark.53 The linking law constituted a form of trademark expropriation,
allowing the local licensee to enjoy a free ride on the reputation and
goodwill embodied in the foreign mark. By this means, the local licensee
hoped that the public would come to associate the particular goods involved
with the licensee's trademark. 54 Thus, if the license were terminated, the
local licensee would enjoy an autonomous goodwill acquired during the
period of dual use. Although this postlicense goodwill could result in a
degree of public deception, Mexico was willing to pay this price to subsidize
local industry and to accept the risk that foreign trademark owners would
hesitate in licensing their products to Mexican firms.
Linking laws are not the only practice hostile to trademark licensors.
Other examples of the antitrademark attitude are found in countries that
prohibit the importation of certain categories of trademark goods such as
pharmaceutical products.55 In addition, some countries have attempted
confiscation of foreign trademarks. 56 Other laws have forced the trademark
owner to manufacture the product on which the mark is affixed in the local
country.
3. Patents
Patent owners perhaps have suffered the most in Third World
countries. In addition to outright counterfeiting, a lack of substantive
protection and an inadequate infrastructure to administer the patent
system have produced a deficient system for the protection of patents in
Third World countries. As a consequence, not only is there a disincentive to
invest, but the welfare and safety of consumers is threatened by infringing
products of substandard quality. Inferior quality pharmaceutical products
which endanger the health of consumers are a common example.
By comparison with trademark laws, patent laws in developing coun-
tries are relatively uniform and seem to be less prejudicial to the rights of
52. The Mexican Government has granted one year extensions of the law since 1978. It is
not the only linking law in existence, but it is perhaps the most drastic example. For a
discussion of other linking laws in the Third World, see Ball, supra note 49, at 163.
53. A Mexican mark is one originally registered in Mexico by a Mexican citizen. Law on
Inventions and Trademarks, Art. 127 (1976).
54. See Gabay, The Role of Trademarks in Consumer Protection and Development in the
Developing Countries, 3 Indus. Prop. 102, 111 (1981). That trademarks may be used as a
means of persuasive advertising is nothing new, and even if foreign marks were eliminated,
local marks may serve the same purpose. It is hard to see how the public would gain by a virtual
confiscation of foreign marks. Whatever gains may occur from less persuasive advertising
could well be- offset by a loss of foreign investment in the developing country. Trademark
licensing encourages economic development in the Third World, as does licensing of all
,intellectual property. Only by licensing can the Third World gain the necessary technological
know-how, marketing expertise, and international reputation of the licensor.
55. In the mid-1970s Pakistan banned the use of trademarks on pharmaceutical products.
See Ball, supra note 49, at 166.
56. See Ball, supra note 49, at 166 (discussing the case of Argentina).
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patent owners. On closer scrutiny, however, many countries fail to provide
basic protection in fundamental ways. The requirement in some countries
that the patentee "work" (use) the patented invention after a certain time of
exclusive use is prejudicial to the rights of patent owners. Even more
prejudicial is the pervasive tolerance of compulsory licensing laws.57 Under
the terms of a compulsory license, a third party can use the patent on
payment of a statutory fee, often at below market prices. The compulsory
license can result in a defacto expropriation of the patent.58
The difference of opinion on compulsory licensing has constituted the
most hostile debate between the West and the developing world. Develop-
ing countries want the ability to grant to firms of their choice (most often
local companies) the right to use patents that have not otherwise been
worked after a specified period of ime, usually five years. This insistence by
developing countries on compulsory licensing stems from the fear that
multinational companies are exploiting local consumers in charging for
full-priced goods made in foreign countries, while at the same time
suppressing local production. Conversely, multinational companies argue
that it is financially impossible to undertake any degree of investment
without assurances from the local country -that adequate safeguards in
patent law will be maintained. The compulsory licensing debate provides a
good example of the irreconcilable positions that exist between the West
and the Third World.
In addition to requiring compulsory licensing, many developing
countries display an antipatent attitude in the subject matter covered by a
patent grant, the length of the patent term, and the lack of an adequate
administrative system to properly examine and expedite patent applica-
tions. Some countries limit the patentability of certain products, such as
chemicals or pharmaceuticals, and generally deny protection altogether as
is the case with patents on processes. Extremely abbreviated patent terms
also may prejudice the rights of patent owners.59 In addition to these
substantive law shortcomings, many developing countries expend few
resources on maintaining a governmental agency to administer the patent
system,60 providing only a handful of examiners to handle thousands of
57. Compulsory licensing is not limited to developing countries. These laws are also found
in such developed countries as France and, until 1988, Canada. See Oyen, The Canadian
Patent Law Amendments of 1987, 4 Intell. Prop. J. 237, 243 (1988).
58. Compulsory licensing is an alien notion in U.S. patent law, which gives the U.S. patent
owner a monopoly to make, use, and sell the patented invention. Negotiations between the
parties will determine the price of a license to exploit the patented invention. By contrast,
compulsory licensing laws allow third parties access to the patented invention if the
prospective user complied with the terms of the compulsory license and pays the statutory fee.
If the compulsory licensing fee is set too low, the patentee may not be able to recover its
investment costs.
59. For example, India has a seven-year term from the filing date or five years from the
patent grant, Egypt has ten years for pharmaceutical and food products, and Costa Rica has
a one-year term for food, agricultural products and drugs. SeegenerallyJ. Baxter, World Patent
Law & Practice (1989) (summary of patent practices in various countries).
60. See generally Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development:
Reality or Myth?, 1987 Duke L.J. 831 (1987) (the great expense incurred in running a patent




In response to arguments in favor of a Western style patent system in
which significant resources are expended, the developing world would
argue that such a system is less justifiable when the returns do not inure to
the country that adopted it. In other words, the patent system imposes
certain costs on the developing country that cannot be justified by the gains
provided by such a system. One cost is the administrative cost of operating
a patent system that is not only substantial but whose benefits almost
entirely inure to Western countries. One can easily understand the reluc-
tance of some developing countries to institute an administrative system
when the only reward is an uncertain degree of technology transfer to local
companies.
The position taken by the developing countries on patent protection
has led to widespread apprehension and resentment by multinational
corporations and patent exporting countries. Some evidence exists that
companies have curtailed both patenting activity and transfer of technology
to the developing world. Statistics show a decline in the number of patents
sought by the Western countries in certain key developing nations. 62 Data
also indicate a decline in the number of transfer agreements. The result is
that the developing world will be endowed with less state-of-the-art
technology, particularly those countries that offer only a relatively small, if
not marginal, market.63
4. Copyrights
Copyright owners also have suffered from organized piracy in the
Third World. Certain developing countries systematically have ignored
organized piracy in books, disks, films, tapes, cassettes, and computer
software within their borders. In addition to governmental acquiescence,
increasingly sophisticated copying techniques aid this piracy. For example,
cassette tape technology has greatly simplified mass copying of music, films,
and other forms of media.
Because copyright laws generally are uniform (with certain notable
exceptions), the problem facing the copyright owner is inadequate enforce-
ment rather than a lack of substantive protection.64 Despite a relative
61. See Yamaguchi, supra note 44, at 326.
62. According to research, "the number of patent applications made in developing
countries has decreased: 33,200 in 1967, of which 20,000 (60.8%) were made in the top four
[countries] (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and India); but, only 29,700 in 1982, of which 17,500
(58.9%) were made by the top four countries (now Brazil, Korea, Mexico, Argentina)." On the
whole, interest ifi- securing patents in the developing world has tended to stagnate or decline.
See G. Bertin & S. Wyatt, supra note 11, at 119; see also Desai, India in the Uruguay Round,
23 J. World Trade L. 33, 47-48 (1989). Desai reports that before the revisions of the Indian
Patent Act, a number of foreign companies brought suit against local firms for breach of
patent. In response, a revised Patent Act "was passed in 1970 which weakened patent
protection. It introduced provisions for compulsory licenses, licenses of right and privileged
access for the state." Id. at 47-48. As a result, patent applications of foreign firms sharply
declined and the number of transfer of technology agreements in pharmaceuticals with
Eastern European countries rose in proportion to those with the West.
63. G. Bertin & S. Wyatt, supra note 11, at 129.
64. See GAO Report, supra note 9, at 11.
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uniformity in the law of copyright, a number of countries provide less
protection to copyrightable subject matter and the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner than is generally given in the West.65 For example, a few
countries in the Middle East provide no copyright protection at all. Other
countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia provide works of foreign origin
with protection only if they are published in their country thirty days after
the date of first being published abroad.66 Less dramatically, but just as
serious to the copyright owner, other countries provide no protection for
new forms of expression such as computer software and semiconductor
chips.67
As in the case of patent law, the developing countries have little to gain
by the rigorous enforcement of copyright law. A copyrighted computer
program can be copied with ease and with low visibility. Effectively
impeding copyright piracy would require a major enforcement effort.
Scarce resources are better spent elsewhere. Similarly, developing countries
believe they are justified in not passing substantive laws in the areas of
software or mask works.68 Developing countries are consumers of these
new technologies and need access to them for purposes of development.
Unrestrained piracy limits the ability of U.S. intellectual property
owners to obtain returns on their investments of time and resources in
developing trademarked products, patented innovations, and copyrighted
works. Because the United States relies more and more on the sale and
licensing of information in its international trade, it perceives its compar-
ative advantage to be at stake. Ideal protection of U.S. intellectual property
runs counter to the interests of developing countries. It is unrealistic for the
United States and other proprietor countries to achieve, at least in the short
run, the degree of protection they desire. What steps, then, should be taken
to optimize intellectual property protection in a world of diverse nations?
The solution will constitute an integrated strategy involving the continuing
enhancement of U.S. law, thejudicious application of bilateral negotiations,
the use of current international institutions, and an innovative extension of
the GATT to encompass intellectual property.
II. CURRENT U.S. APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL PIACY
To protect their creations, intellectual property owners have looked to
the many available remedies under domestic and international law. They
have urged the enhancement of U.S. domestic law and have sought
recourse under international conventions. In addition, Congress has given
65. See generally Teran, International Copyright Developments-A Third World Perspec-
tive, 30J. Copyright Soc'y 129 (1982) (noting United States concern about copyright policy in
developing nations that do not enforce intellectual property rights).
66. See GAO Report, supra note 9, at 11.
67. Id.
68. See E. Keet, Preventing Piracy: A Business Guide to Software Protection 129 (1985)
(Third World countries assert that copyright laws restrict economic development). Mask works
are the stencils (drawings) used in manufacturing semiconductor chips. Creation of these
"masks" is a costly and critical element of microchip production. For a legal definition of mask
works, see 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2) (1988). For a discussion of the Semiconductor Chip Act of
1984, which confers protection on mask works, see M. Leaffer, supra note 32, at § 3.09.
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increased power to the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") to seek
bilateral trade-based measures to persuade countries to adopt adequate
laws. A general consensus has formed around the idea that the ultimate
solution must lie in a multilateral trade-based approach under the auspices
of the GATT. In developing this trade-based approach, the USTR, the U.S.
International Trade Commission ("ITC"), the State Department, and the
Copyright, Patent, and Trademark Office are playing a role in forging
integrated policy5
The United States has. tried to fight the problem of piracy through a
three-pronged attack. First, a program of unilateral action has strength-
ened the protection afforded by U.S. law and curtailed the importation of
counterfeit goods into the United States. Second, the United States has
tried to place direct pressure on problem countries through bilateral
negotiations that enforce compliance through trade sanctions. Third, the
United States has sought relief through multilateral treaties administered
through international agencies. Although the most promising new ap-
proach is perceived to be the protection of intellectual property rights
through the GATT, both unilateral and bilateral efforts must continue,
coordinating a uniform and consistent policy to discourage piracy.
A. Strengthening U.S. Intellectual Property Law
Congress has recently strengthened the protection afforded to U.S.
intellectual property owners by passing major amendments to the trade-
mark, patent, and copyright laws. Thishas harmonized U.S. law with the
general standards of protection in the Western world. Legislative initiatives
have plugged loopholes and have enhanced coverage under U.S. law. For
example, until the enactment of the recent amendments, U.S. patent law
did not protect products made abroad that infringed upon patented
processes. This loophole was closed by an amendment to the Patent Act. 70
Even more dramatic are the recent changes to U.S. trademark law. The
Trademark Counterfeit Act of 198471 greatly strengthened remedies for
trademark counterfeiting, and the 1988 amendments established for the
first time an application of registration based on the proposed use of a
mark.72 Momentous changes also have taken place in the copyright law,
which has undergone a vast overhaul during the last fifteen years. In 1976,
the Copyright Act73 was revised completely to meet the challenge of the late
twentieth century media. By a 1980 amendment, computer software was
69. GAO Report, supra note 9, at 17.
70. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1984). Another change in the patent law has been the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 155-56 (1990)), which, among other things, restores the term of patent on a
product for half the period of regulatory review, not to exceed five years. Id. at 98 Stat.
1598-1603 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 155-56 (1990)). See also Patent Law Amendments Act of
1984, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (prohibiting the supplying of components of a patented U.S.
invention for assembly abroad); Inventions in Outer Space, Pub. L. No. 101-580, 104 Stat.
2863 (1990), amending 35 U.S.C. § 105 (1988) (inventions made, used, or sold on a space
vehicle under U.S. jurisdiction shall be covered by U.S. patent laws).
71. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178 (1984).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (1988).
73. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
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given explicit protection in the Act.74 In 1988, the Act underwent another
revision to allow adherence to the Berne Convention, and in this revision
the rights of copyright owners were strengthened and penalties for
copyright infringement were increased.75
Traditional forms of intellectual property protection have proven to
be inadequate for certain new technologies. Semiconductor chips presented
a problem for legal protection under traditional patent law because they
often lacked the inventiveness sufficient to meet the standards of patent-
ability. Semiconductor chips also were barred from copyright protection
because they are essentially utilitarian. To remedy serious gaps in protec-
tion, Congress responded by creating new safeguards for intellectual
property, the model of which can be found in the Semiconductor Chip Act
of 1984.76 This Act provides a sui generis approach to semiconductor chip
protection and extends coverage to a major new technology vitally impor-
tant to the U.S. economy. The Act also provides an innovative statutory
solution to the problem and contains procedures to encourage protection in
foreign countries through bilateral negotiations.77
Although U.S. intellectual property law has undergone key
revisions, 73 changes must continue to occur that will enable the United
States to join a worldwide consensus on standards of protection. Changing
U.S. law to conform to these world standards will not only strengthen
domestic law, but will give the United States further leverage in promoting
a GATT intellectual property code that will set standards for the world
community. One prospective major change lies in U.S. patent law, which
differs significantly from world practice. The United States is the only
Western country to confer patent rights to the first proven inventor. By
comparison, the rest of the world bases protection on the first-to-file for the
patent.79 In a short time, Congress may see fit to adopt a first-to-file
system.80 Other changes on the intellectual property agenda would include
adoption of industrial design protection. Legislation conferring specific
74. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1988); Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (Oct. 31, 1988) (effective Mar. 1, 1989). For other recent changes
to U.S. copy~ight law, conferring enhanced protection for the copyright owner, see Pub. L.
No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (providing protection for architectured works and the
rights of visual artists, and abrogating trust sale doctrine as it applies to producers of computer
software).
76. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988). A semiconductor chip, the building block of
computers, is a wafer-thin slice of silicon, composed of integrated circuits. These circuits
consist of thousands of complex logic functions. For an overview of the Act, see Erstling, The
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act and Its Impact on the International Protection of Chip
Designs, 15 Rutgers Computer and Tech. L.J. 303 (1989); Note, Protection of United States
Semiconductor Designs in Foreign Countries Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
of 1984, 12 Rutgers Computer and Tech. L.J. 433 (1987).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 914 (1988).
78. Sentiment in the U.S. industry also appears to be shifting toward a first-to-file system.
See Lachica, U.S. is Offering to Revise its Patent Code if Other Countries Agree to Reciprocate,
Wall St. J., June 15, 1988, at 21, col. 3.
79. For instance, Canada recently adopted a first-to-file system. See Oyen, supra note 57,
at 237.
80. See Dunner, First to File: Should Our Interference System Be Abolished? 68 J. Pat.
Off. Soc'y 561 (1986).
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protection on industrial design has been introduced into Congress yearly in
the past decades without success,$' but it may be that the time for protection
has come.
B. Policing the Borders: Section 337 of the Tariff Act
Counterfeit goods make their way into the U.S. market, often under-
selling goods of legitimate origin. These goods include clothing sold under
infringing trademarks, bootleg videocassettes, patented pharmaceuticals,
and illegally copied software. Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,82 as
amended,83 designates a remedy against the importation of infringing
goods. The Act provides for relief against unfair methods of competition
and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States or their
sale. Unfair acts include trademark, patent, copyright, and mask work
infringement which occur in connection with the importation of goods into
the United States. This section prohibits "unfair methods of competition
and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States."8 4
Under section 337, private citizens can petition to proceed before the U.S.
International Trade Commission ("ITC"),85 which has the power to exclude
the importation of infringing articles. For example, a drug manufacturer,
a copyright owner of an audiovisual work, or a trademark owner of an
article of clothing could potentially petition the ITC to exclude the
importation of the counterfeit drug, videocassette, or article of clothing.8 6
Despite their usefulness in impeding infringing works from entering
the U.S. market, actions under section 337 provide limited help in the fight
against the international piracy of intellectual property. Section 337 has
serious procedural, substantive, and practical limitations.8 7 First, petition-
81. See, e.g., Design Protection Act of 1985, H.R. 1900, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
82. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
83. For an overview of U.S. International Trade Commission procedure as applied to
patent law, see Krosin & Kozlowski, Patent Based Suits at the International Trade Commission
Following the 1988 Amendments to Section 337, 17 AIPLA 47 (1989).
84. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1988).
85. Section 337 cases are litigated before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") who
conducts the litigation similar to a federal court judge. If the ALJ finds a violation, and no
appeal is made to the ITC, an in rem order excluding the infringing articles from the United
States may be issued. This is known as an "exclusion order," and is often a more effective
remedy than an injunction, which would require personal jurisdiction over foreign manufac-
turers or exporters. In addition, articles subject to an exclusion order can be seized and
forfeited in certain clear instances of bad faith on the part of the owner or importer of the
articles. Those instances are when "the owner, importer, or consignee previously attempted to
import the article into the United States; ... or the article was previously denied entry into the
United States" by a previous exclusion order. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(i)(A), (B) (1988). The
exclusion order does not take effect immediately. The President has 60 days to review it for
possible veto. At the end of 60 days, the order becomes effective, although review of the
Commission's determination is available by the federal courts of appeals. Unlike private
litigation, the plaintiff does not have to bear the cost of service and enforcement. See generally
Lupo, International Trade Commission Section 387 Proceedings and Their Applicability to
Copyright Ownership, 32 J. Copyright Soc'y 193 (1985).
86. See Newman, The Amendments to Section 337: Increased Protection for Intellectual
Property Rights, 20 Law & Pol'y in Int'l Bus. 571, 581 (1989).
87. In addition to the limitations listed in the text, section 337 has caused tension with U.S.
trading partners because it violates the GATT provisions. In 1987, the European Community
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ers are faced with difficult burden of proof problems. Although recent
amendments have abrogated the necessity to prove domestic injury,
petitioners still must prove that the products are indeed infringing. Relief
is also limited in an action under section 337 because petitioners cannot
obtain damages, only a cease and desist order. This lack of remedial teeth
has rendered action under section 337 ineffective against unscrupulous,
determined pirates. Absent fear of damages, dishonest importers are
tempted to import until ordered to stop. Even if so ordered, they often find
other channels of distribution to import the infringing products.88
C. The Multilateral Approach: International Treaties and the Role of
the World Intellectual Property Organization
It is a truism that the problem of intellectual property piracy hardly
can be remedied by purely domestic initiatives. Once counterfeit goods are
produced, they will find their way into world markets. Consequently, an
integrated solution must include a coordinated international effort.
Through the years, U.S. intellectual property owners have looked to the
various international agreements covering trademark, patent, copyright,
and related matters to protect their intellectual property rights worldwide.
The major treaties89 are administered by the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO"), a United Nations organization estab-
lished in 1967 and headquartered in Geneva.90 One of seventeen special-
ized agencies of the United Nations,91 the WIPO promotes the protection
of intellectual property rights. For this purpose, it collaborates with a large
number of international and intergovernmental organizations. In so doing,
the WIPO gives legal and technical assistance and provides educational and
training programs. It has established working groups in all areas of
Commiision initiated complaint procedures under the GATT, alleging that Section 337
discriminates against foreign companies.
The GATF panel ruled in November of 1988 that in most cases Section 337 was
not compatible with Article III of the GATT .... The panel reasoned that Section 337
discriminates against foreign companies because it gives the ITC jurisdiction over
imported products while domestic companies which infringe patents are never
brought before the ITC.
In addition, "under ITC procedures foreign companies may not raise counterclaims as they
could in (U.S.] federal court." See Foreign Trade: EC Endorses Panel's Ruling That § 337
Violates GA'TT Non-Discrimination Rules, 37 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 1, 302
(Feb. 2, 1989); Foreign Trade: GATT Council Finds That § 337 Discriminates Against
Foreign Corpanies, 39 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 29, 29-30 (Nov. 9, 1989).
88. For an overview of these problems as they relate to process patents, see Gould,
Protecting Owners of U.S. Process Patents From the Importation of Pharmaceuticals Made
Abroad by Use of the Patented Process: Current Options, Proposed Legislation, and a GATT
Solution, 42 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 346, 354-55 (1987).
89. The most important of these treaties are the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property and the Berne Copyright Convention. For a text of the major treaties on
intellectual property with commentary, see International Treaties on Intellectual Property (M.
Leaffer ed. 1990).
90. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Special Agency, United Nations, Pub.
No. 436(E), WIPO: What It Is, What It Does (1987).




intellectual property, including trademarks, patents, copyrights, and de-
sign. The WIPO administers thirteen unions and conventions, of which the
United States is party to seven, and presides over conferences designed to
revise these conventions. 92 The most important conventions are the Paris
Union (ninety-seven members)93 and the Berne Convention (seventy-six
members).94 U.S. participation in the international community progressed
with its participation in the Berne Convention in March of 1989. 95
The international conventions have served and will continue to serve
a useful function in protecting intellectual property worldwide. But from a
U.S. perspective, these conventions still have significant drawbacks despite
their importance to the world community. The conventions fail to provide
adequate substantive norms covering important subject matter areas and
flexible dispute resolution mechanisms when member states do not meet
their treaty obligations.
Inadequate subject matter coverage has occurred in international
treaties because they traditionally have excluded important areas of intel-
lectual property. For example, trade secret protection receives no recogni-
tion in the treaty system. Moreover, incorporation of important new
technologies has lagged. Semiconductor chip protection is not subject to an
international arrangement, and such an arrangement has been stymied by
the developing countries.9 6
92. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Special Agency, United Nations, Pub.
No. 659(E), Background Reading Material on Intellectual Property 39 (1988); M. Leaffer,
supra note 16, at 595-610.
93. Established in 1883, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
covers industrial property in the widest sense, including inventions, tradenames, trademarks,
service marks, industrial designs, utility models, and unfair competition.
94. See generally Kirk, WIPO's Involvement in International Developments, 50 Alb. L. Rev.
601 (1986) (outlining important topics in international developments).
95. The Berne Convention was established in 1886 at a diplomatic conference by the Swiss
Federal Council as a union of states for the protection of literary and artistic works. The
United States had been one of the few countries (the USSR and China being the other major
countries) that was not a member of this most important international copyright convention.
Adherence to Berne required significant changes in U.S. policy. Before Berne, the United
States relied on bilateral agreements and the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC). The
UCC is administered by UNESCO, a UN organization from which the United States has
withdrawn. Interest in joining the world copyright community and establishing copyright
relationships with countries not covered by either bilateral agreements or the universal
copyright conventions provided the impetus for U.S. entry. For an overview of the reasons for
U.S adherence to Berne, see Hatch, Better Late Than Never: Implementation of the 1886
Berne Convention, 22 Cornell Int'l L.J. 171 (1989).
96. The developing countries have been successful in blocking an integrated circuit treaty
proposed by the WIPO. See Third World Questions the Need for Integrated Circuit Treaty, 34
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 59-60 (May 21, 1987). On May 26, 1989, a diplomatic
conference in Washington, D.C. adopted the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of
Integrated Circuits. The United States and Japan, by far the world's largest producers of
semiconductor chips, have refused to sign the treaty. The Treaty has been signed by only six
Third World countries: Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. The U.S.
objections to the Treaty have focused on the broad compulsory licensing provisions, the short
term of protection, the lack of compensation for innocent infringement, the failure to
adequately address the issue of importation of products that contain infringing chips, and the
dispute resolution process which it considers to be too "politicized." See U.S., Japan Refuse to
Sign Treaty to Protect Integrated Circuits, 3 World Intel. Prop. Rep. 156 (1989). For a text of
the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, see Industrial Property
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The Paris Union, the Berne Convention, and the other international
arrangements do not create truly transnational rights for intellectual
property, nor do they include a meaningful system for the enforcement of
minimum standards of protection. They simply confer national protection
with certain minimum rights.9 7 The Conventions do little to harmonize
administration practices, which vary from country to country.
The Conventions have proven to be ineffective when countries simply
do not enforce their laws. The agreements do not contain effective
mechanisrmas for challenging countries that ignore their obligations. 98 The
reason for this inability to develop effective enforcement mechanisms
relates to the political makeup of the WIPO. The WIPO has served as a
forum sympathetic to those who have an anti-intellectual property position.
As would be expected, most of the opposition to enhancing the WIPO's role
as an effective forum against international piracy has come from the
developing countries. 99 This opposition has curtailed efforts to incorporate
a dispute settlement mechanism within the WIPO context to address the
problem of inadequate protection for intellectual property. 100 Although a
serious need exists for a uniformity of international norms, this position
runs counter to the current institutional arrangement under the interna-
tional treaties.10' In sum, the multinational conventions have not been ideal
mechanisms for challenging noncompliant countries.'0 2
Because the international convention system is unable to deal with the
problem of international piracy of intellectual propetty, those affected have
called for a fresh approach. This approach must be trade-based and flexible
enough to meet the needs of the international community faced with a
piracy problem that cannot be solved by traditional means.
at text 1-011, 001-007 (June 1989).
97. For example, the Paris Convention stipulates a right to priority for patents, trade-
marks, and industrial designs. This right to priority works as follows: on the basis of a regular
application filed in one or more of the contracting states, an applicant may apply for
protection in another contracting state within a given time period. The application will be
regarded as having been filed at the same time as the original. The Berne Convention also
stipulates minimum rights, such as a minimum term of at least the life of the author plus fifty
years and the right to copyright protection conferred by member states without formalities
such as copyright notice and registration. See generally M. Leaffer, supra note 16, at 1-14
(describing Paris and Berne Union systems).
98. For an overview of Convention violations, see Gansser, Violations of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 11 Int'l Rev. Indus. Prop. Copyright L.
(IIC) 1 (1981)).
99. See GAO Report, supra note 9, at 25.
100. See Revision of the Paris Convention on Industrial Property: Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982).
101. Dissatisfaction with the WIPO and the international conventions relates to a larger
dissatisfaction with the one nation, one vote system in the international sphere. The
developing countries constitute overwhelming majorities in many of the international institu-
tions. See Jackson, Remarks, 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 343, 349 (1989).
102. See GAO Report, supra note 9, at 25.
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D. The Bilateral Trade-Based Approach: Section 301 of the Trade Act
Frustrated with current international arrangements covering intellec-
tual property, many persons in business and government have pushed for
a bilateral trade-based approach as the best short-term solution to the
piracy dilemma.' 03 The bilateral approach involves the use of direct
negotiations, facilitated by economic sanctions, with a given country in
order to achieve an agreement over intellectual property matters. This
tactic is not new. Bilateral trade agreements have long been a mainstay of
U.S. policy.104 Over the years, the United States has entered into a series of
bilateral agreements on patent and copyright law. 10 5
Bilateral negotiations can effectively promote U.S. interests. They can
target practices of a particular country offensive to U.S. interests and do so
in an expeditious manner. By employing direct trade sanctions against
noncomplying countries, the current U.S. bilateral effort coerces problem
countries to adopt adequate standards of protection. The idea is the carrot
and the stick.'0 6 Former noncomplying countries receive the right to export
to the United States as a most favored nation in exchange for providing
proper intellectual property protection. 0 7 Thus, if protection is adequate
in the foreign country, U.S. direct investment will occur and export to the
United States will be facilitated.
When bilateral persuasion is ineffective, the United States can
threaten to impose unilateral -trade sanctions. These sanctions have been
greatly strengthened by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988,108 which mandated the protection of intellectual property rights as
one of the priorities of U.S. trade policy. Under these 1988 Amendments to
103. See Basic Framework, supra note 36, at 16-17.
104. See H. Stalson, supra note 9, at 60.
105. See U.S. Copyright Office International Copyright Relations of the United States
Circular 38(a).
106. See The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act ("CBRA"), Pub. L. No. 98-67,
§ 212(b)(5), 97 Stat. 369, 384-87 (1983) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(9) (1988)), which
conditions the benefits of the Caribbean Basin Initiative on the executive branch finding that
governmental organizations do not engage in poaching and retransmittal of broadcast signals.
The CBRA was followed by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 503,
505, 98 Stat. 2948, 3019-23 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2462(c)(5), 2464(c)(3)(B)(ii) (1988)),
which delegates authority to the President to consider a country's laws and practices in
adequately protecting intellectual property rights as a condition of receiving the trade benefits
of the Generalized System of Preferences Program (GSP). Section 304 of the Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984 clarified § 301 of the Trade Act, which applies to instances where intellectual
property is inadequately protected. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(C), 2411(d)(4)(B) (1988).
In 1988, Congress enacted the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-418, §§ 1301-1480, 1341-42, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164-84, 1211-16, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337,
2411 (1988). Under these amendments, the United States Trade Representative must assess
annually the adequacy and effectiveness of the intellectual property protection offered by U.S.
trading partners.
107. See, e.g., USTR Creates Priority Watch List Not Priority Country List, 38 Pat.
Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) 119 (June 1, 1989); USTR Will Begin 301 Investigation of
Argentina's Patent Laws for Drugs, 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 583 (Sept. 29,
1988). The USTR has identified 25 countries for special watch. See also Thailand Denied
Certain GSP Benefits for Weak Intellectual Property laws, 37 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 279-80 (Jan. 26, 1989) (possible action under "Super 301").
108. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2411-2420 (West Supp. 1990).
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the Trade Act,109 the government may use trade measures as leverage to
achieve adequate protection of U.S. intellectual property worldwide. Until
the 1988 amendments, section 301 of the Trade Act did not force action by
the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") or the President, who retained
complete discretion in deciding whether to take action and the type of
action to take.
The new amendments enhance the role of the USTR in negotiating
U.S. interests." 0 They give the USTR discretion to initiate section 301
investigations.I1 But once an investigation is initiated, the Trade Act limits
USTR discretion and requires mandatory action in cases involving unjus-
tifiable acts, such as a failure to protect intellectual property." 2 Under the
Trade Act, the form of any retaliatory action is discretionary, but the Act
requires that either a preference to tariff increases be given or that tariff
preferences be removed. Section 301 gives explicit authority to the USTR
to enter into binding agreements with foreign countries."
3
The 1988 Trade Act has established a special section 301 procedure
requiring the USTR to identify countries that deny adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property rights," 4 "priority" countries that are the
most egregious intellectual property transgressors, and countries that fail to
undertake or make progress in negotiations with the USTR."15 The process
of establishing priority countries is designed to lead ultimately to the
imposition of sanctions if progress cannot be made. On May 25, 1989,
pursuant to these provisions, the USTR placed seventeen countries on a
"watch lit"16 and eight countries on a priority watch list."7 Because
intellectual property protection has become a high priority trade isiue, the
role of the USTR has now superseded the role of both the Department of
State and the U.S. Customs Service." 8
Advocates of the bilateral approach maintain that the problem of
intellectual property piracy is too pressing to be handled by international
agreement, and that we simply do not have time to suffer through the
109. Both the GSP and CBRA link adequate protection of intellectual property with a most
favored nation status. See supra note 106 for a discussion of the GSP and the CBRA.
110. See generally USTR Fact Sheets on Super 301 Trade Liberalization Priorities and
Special 301 on Intellectual Property, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 715-21 (May 31, 1989)
[hereinafter USTR Fact Sheets] (discussing how "Super 301" provisions demand "identifica-
tion of U.S. trade liberalization negotiating principles by May 28 this year").
111. 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (c) (1988).
112. Section 301 imposes mandatory action on the executive branch, but contains rather
broad escape clauses that cast doubt on the extent to which the executive branch is bound. See
19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(B)(iv) (1988).
113. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a), (b)(2), (c)(2)(C), (d)(3)(B)(i)(II), (d)(4)(B) (1988).
114. Id. {i 2241.
115. Id. § 2242(a)(2), (b), (c).
116. Countries included on the list are: Argentina, Malaysia, Canada, Pakistan, Chile, the
Philippines, Colombia, Portugal, Egypt, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Indonesia, Venezuela, Italy,,
Yugoslavia, and Japan. See USTR Fact Sheets, supra note 110, at 119.
117. Countries included on the priority watch list are: Brazil, the Republic of Korea, India,
Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Taiwan, the People's Republic of China, and Thailand. Id.
118. See GAO Report, supra note 9, at 17. The Department of State sponsors negotiations
covering inzernational agreements on intellectual property and the U.S. Customs Service
impedes entry of counterfeit goods into the country. Id.
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laborious process of changing international institutional arrangements.11 9
Even the most promising of these negofiations, which are currently taking
place in the GATT framework, may take years to complete and yield no
results.
The bilateral trade-based approach has enjoyed concrete successes in
various countries. Notable examples include Taiwan, which amended its
copyright law to allow for more stringent penalties against pirates and
enacted a new patent law. In response to direct pressure, Singapore has
passed an improved copyright law, and Korea has made several improve-
ments in its intellectual property coverage. 120
Despite these successes, bilateral trade agreements may run counter to
U.S. long-term interests for a healthy, stable trade environment. The
international system is one in which the rights and obligations among states
are equal, and in which trade is based on the principle of nondiscrimina-
tion, otherwise known as most favored nation treatment.' 2 ' The current
trend, however, toward arbitrary unilateral action under Section 301 runs
counter to these basic long-term interests.' 22
In general, bilateral agreements tend to fragment the world trading
system. They can create resentment, particularly among Third World
countries who view imposed bilateral agreements as a species of colonial-
ism. These tensions have come to fruition in the USTR's imposition of $40
million in ad valorem tariffs on certain Brazilian imports in response to
Brazil's long-standing refusal to confer patent protection on pharmaceuti-
cals. Brazil has countered that its patent policy is a matter of local concern
and contravenes none of its responsibilities under international treaties or
the GATT. Brazil is correct in its assertion that patent protection for
pharmaceuticals neither is mandated by the Paris Convention nor consti-
tutes a discrimination against foreign imports under the GATT. Moreover,
Brazil claims that the U.S. initiative under Section 301 violates U.S.
responsibilities under the GATF.' 23
119. For a lively debate on the relative advantages of the bilateral and multilateral
approaches, see Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case For Bilateral Agreements, 22
Cornell Int'l L.J. 1 (1989); Aho, More Bilateral Agreements Would be a Blunder: What the
President Should Do, 22 Cornell Int'l L.J. 25 (1989).
120. For a summary of these numerous successes, see Office of the United States
Representative, Special 301 on Intellectual Property, May 25, 1989; see also Note, A
Trade-Based Response to Intellectual Piracy: A Comprehensive Plan to Aid the Motion
Picture Industry, 76 Geo. L.J. 417, 446-47, 458-59, 487-88 (1987); Treaties: Indonesia Signs
Bilateral Agreement With U.S. to Protect Copyrights, 37 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 634-35 (Apr. 13, 1989); Conferences: U.S. Continuing Efforts to Negotiate Bilateral
Agreements to Curb Piracy, 37 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) 11-12 (Nov. 3, 1988).
121. See Aho, supra note 119, at 32.
122. See Bliss, The Amendments to Section 301: An Overview and Suggested Strategies for
Foreign Response, 20 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 501, 503 (1989).
123. See 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 238 (Feb. 22, 1989).
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III. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE-BASED APPROACH)
A. Background
Intellectual property protection has become a trade issue as the
economies of the United States and other Western countries have become
dependent on selling information. As transfer of technology becomes
increasingly internationalized, and the costs of production of this informa-
tion become continually more expensive, Western countries, and particu-
larly the United States, need a vast international market to recover their
costs. If the costs cannot be recouped, the result will be less production and
less trade in technology. The large disparity between the inventor's costs
and those of the pirate may result in an effective trade barrier-even more
so than a tariff.' 24 In the face of these challenges, the international bodies
governing intellectual property have been largely ineffective. By the early
1980s, the United States and other Western countries began to look for an
innovative multilateral solution to the piracy dilemma. In this context, the
GATT began to be seen as the international institution best equipped to
provide the needed remedy.
B. Overview of the GATT
The GATT is the most important international agreement regulating
trade among nations, with more than ninety countries, accounting for well
over four-fifths of world trade, now subscribing to the agreement. The
GATT was formed after the Second World War through negotiations
between the United States and the United Kingdom culminating in the
Havana charter, and it came into effect on January 1, 1948.12 -5 Paradoxi-
cally, the GATT was conceived as an ancillary tariff agreement to work
within the context of a more broadly designed International Trade Orga-
nization, which would work alongside the International Monetary Fund
and the International Bank for Reconstruction. Intended to be no more
than interim measures, the GATT provisions were to be incorporated into
the larger organization. 126 The International Trade Organization never
materialized, but the GATT has remained in place since the late 1940s.
Despite its ambiguous origins and incoherent organizational structure, the
GATT has been surprisingly successful.
127
The GATT's declared objective is to provide a framework of certainty
and predictability about the conditions in which traders conduct their
transactions in the world market. It is the only multilateral instrument that
lays down agreed upon rules for the conduct of international trade. The
GA"TT also is a forum for negotiations as well as a code of rules. 128
124. See H. Stalson, supra note 9, at 51.
125. See S. Golt, The GATT Negotiations 1986-90: Origins, Issues, and Prospects 2 (1988).
126. R. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy 9-10, 45-46 (1975).
127. See Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in A Lawyer's Guide to
International Business Transactions 41, 43 (W. Surrey & D. Wallace Jr. 2d ed. 1977)
[hereinafter Jackson, General Agreement].
128. See S. Golt, supra note 125, at 2.
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Concerned primarily with the international trade of goods, the GATT
system, which is constantly evolving, is based on five basic principles: (1) the
most favored nation principle (contracting parties must give unconditional
most favored nation treatment to the products of other contracting parties);
(2) the national treatment principle (contracting parties may not impose
more onerous internal taxes or regulations on imported products than on
similar domestic products); (3) the tariff concession principle (contracting
parties must maintain customs duties on imported products at levels not
more than those specified in the latest applicable schedules that the party
has filed); (4) the principle against nontariff barriers (contracting parties
should not use quantitative and other nontariff barriers to restrict trade);
(5) the fair trade principle (contracting parties should not promote exports
through subsidies or dumping and may defend domestic industries from
such unfair practices only through the use of reasonable, proportionate
tariff measures). 29 In addition, the GATT also provides a dispute settle-
ment mechanism, a necessary adjunct to an international body whose goal
is to harmonize today's complex international trading relationships.
C. Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round
Whether the GATT could play a role in the protection of intellectual
property among nations has been discussed since the late 1970s.130 But only
in the Uruguay Round of the GATT, possibly the most comprehensive
round in its history, 131 has the idea gained momentum. The role of the
GATT in the protection of intellectual property surfaced for the first time
129. See K. Dam, supra note 20, at 17-22; J. Jackson, supra note 20, at 54. There are several
key GATT provisions. Article I makes a general commitment to the principle of the most
favored nation ("MFN") with which any contracting party must comply. K. Simmonds & B.
Hill, supra note 20, § L.A at 1-2. Under the MFN, any privilege granted by any contracting
party to any product imported from any other country must also be granted immediately and
unconditionally to any like product imported from any contracting parties. Article XXIV(9)
allows the formation of a free trade area between two or more contracting parties. Id. at 57-62.
Article XI prohibits the use of other prohibitions or restrictions on imports from contracting
parties. Id. at 54-55. Article XIII requires nondiscrimination in quantitative trade restriction.
Id. at 18-19. Article VI concerns dumping. Id. at 12-15. Articles XIX, XX, and XXI permit
trade restrictions by a contracting party to protect certain national interests. Id. at 51-52,
54-55. Article XXV commits contracting parties to a series of meetings to seek further
reductions in barriers to international trade. Id. at 19-20. Articles XXII and XXIII deal with
dispute resolution. Id. at 55-56.
130. Intellectual property is considered only tangentially by the GATT. Article IX
established that marks of origin should not be used to hamper international trade. K.
Simmonds & B. Hill, supra note 20, at 19-20. Article XX(d), however, places trademarks,
patents, and copyrights and the prevention of deceptive practices among the exceptions in the
GATT. Id. at 53.
131. In addition to the inclusion in the Uruguay Round of the intellectual property issue,
the GATT is considering other extremely complicated trade matters. Some specific issues on
the agenda are a greater liberalization of the agricultural policies of member nations, trade in
services, and the modification and strengthening of the GATTs dispute settlement mecha-
nisms. See Results of the GATT Ministerial Meeting Held in Punta del Este, Uruguay:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 12-15 (1986) (statement of the Hon. Clayton Yeutter, U.S. Trade
Representative). The current Uruguay round negotiations broke down at a ministerial
meeting at Brussels on December 7, 1990. Dullforce & Montaguon, An EC Pitchfork in the
Works, Fin. Times, Dec. 8, 1990, § 1, at 6, col. 4.
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at the end of the Tokyo Round in the 1970s. These discussions, which
concerned the counterfeiting of trademarks, launched a serious effort to
integrate intellectual property into the GATT.132 These talks focused on
the propc.sed code to discourage trade in counterfeit trademarked goods,
the draft of which was prepared by the United States but was never
submitted to the GATT. 33 Beginning with this draft code, the U.S. scope
has broadened to include all forms of intellectual property within the
GATT framework. 134
Political pressure in the West has played a key role in placing the
intellectual property issue at the .forefront of the trade negotiating calen-
dar. Industry advocates both here and abroad have actively promoted the
GATT solution.135 United States lobby groups have pointed to the use of
section 301 and other trade sanction provisions as clear precedents for a
trade-based approach to intellectual property protection. They maintain
that these sanctions are more effective in changing certain practices of
Third World nations than recourse to traditional international institutional
agreements. In sum, a general consensus in the West has placed the
intellectual property issue at the top of the current GATT negotiations in
the Uruguay Round.'36
D. Strengths and Limitations of the GATT
1. Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
The GATT is perceived to have certain advantages over other
multinational remedies in solving the problem of intellectual property
piracy. As a principle advantage, the GATT provides not only a forum for
negotiations, but also an enforcement mechanism that does not exist in
traditional multilateral agreements. By comparison, under the multilateral
132. See GAO Report, supra note 9, at 35. The introduction of intellectual property rights
into the Uruguay Round took place through difficult negotiations during a six year period
beginning in 1980. See generally Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade
in Services in the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations, 23 Stan. J. Int'l L. 57 (1987)
(describing history of U.S. involvement to include intellectual property rights, investment, and
trade in services in GATT negotiations).
133. See GAO Report, supra note 9, at 35.
134. The passage of U.S. trade legislation, the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 and the
Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, greatly influenced the move toward
a consideration of intellectual property in the Uruguay Round. See Bradley, supra note 132,
at 64-65. Over the objection of several developing countries, intellectual property was included
in the Uruguay Round. Intense pressure from U.S. Trade Representative Yeutter, who
threatened ihat the United States would turn to bilateral measures, proved to be persuasive.
Id. at 85.
135. See U.S., European and Japanese Business Groups Agree on Intellectual Property
Approach to GATT, Intellectual Property Committee, June 14, 1988. The industry groups
most active in this effort are the U.S. Intellectual Property Committee ("IPC"), the Japanese
Federation of Economic Organization (Keidanren), and the Union of Industrial and Employ-
ers' Confederations of Europe ('UNICE"). The members of the IPC include Bristol-Meyers,
Dupont, FWC Corporation, General Electric, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Pfizer,
and others.
136. See Turnbull, Intellectual Property and GATT: TRIPS at the Midterm, 1 J. Propri-
etary Rts. 10 (1989).
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conventions such as the Berne Convention and the Union of Paris, a
country can overtly ignore its obligations without fear of sanctions within
the treaty mechanism. The GATT's dispute settlement procedures,137
which facilitate bilateral consultations between governments, constitute the
key to a successful multilateral strategy to curb the problem of piracy.
Through the years, the GATT has developed procedures for settling
disputes by using third party panels of experts. After a complaint has been
filed by an aggrieved party, the review proceeds to permanent GATT
committees and third party panels of experts who investigate and attempt
to resolve the dispute. These experts act in their individual capacities and
not as representatives of governments.'3 8 The panel reports its conclusions
and recommendations to the entire body of contracting parties. The body
then rules on the matter, and generally defers to the panel's
recommendations. 3 9 Although the dispute settlement mechanism has
produced mixed success, there is nothing similar to it under the multilateral
conventions. If a dispute arises under the WIPO conventions, a claimant
must bring the dispute before the International Court of Justice.
140
The GATT dispute settlement mechanism is occasionally ineffective
and inefficient. Recent GATT cases are notorious for interminable hear-
ings and extreme politicalization by member countries.' 4 1 If the GATT is to
become a more effective organization, these shortcomings in the dispute
mechanism must be remedied. 142 Accordingly, some negotiators suggest
that more attention should be given to surveillance procedures and the
137. The dispute settlement provisions are found in two articles of the GATT. Article XXII
provides that any contracting party, when asked, will consult with any other contracting party
with respect to any matter affecting the operation of the General Agreement. K. Simmonds &
B. Hill, supra note 20, at I.A. 55. Article XXIII, entitled "Nullification and Impairment,"
basically provides that GATF contracting parties may suspend the obligation toward the
contracting party that has caused the impairment or nullification. Id. at 55-56; see also Davey,
Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 Fordham Int'l L.J. 51 (1987). See generally Bliss, GATT
Dispute Settlement Reform in the Uruguay Round: Problems and Prospects, 23 Stan. J. Int'l
L. 31 (1987) (discussing reform in the Uruguay Round, including GATT dispute settlement
procedures).
138. See Davey, supra note 137, at 58.
139. See R. Hudec, supra note 126, at 74-96 (discussing the GATT dispute settlement
mechanism).
140. See GAO Report, supra note 9, at 36-37 (comparing the GATT and WIPO dispute
resolution procedures).
141. A 1987 GAO study of GATT dispute settlement procedures reported that the average
U.S. complaint to the GATT took 45 months to resolve. See GAO Report, GAO Publication
No. N.S./ AP-87-100 at 18 (Mar. 1987). In the so-called DISC case, in which the European
Community alleged that certain U.S. tax legislation amounted to an export subsidy, it took
almost three years to appoint the panel. For a discussion of the DISC case, see Jackson, The
Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT, 72 Am.J. Int'l L. 747 (1978).
From an historical perspective, GATT dispute settlement was considered effective during the
first twenty years, but it has become progressively less effective. In addition to long delays and
.ineffective implementation, the GATT dispute mechanism also has suffered criticism because
of its emphasis on judicial solutions for problems that could be solved only through
negotiations. For the above reasons, the GATT dispute resolution system has been used less
and less. For example, between 1959 and 1978, the GATT dispute settlement was invoked
only once per year. See Davey, supra note 137, at 62-63.
142. See Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished
Business, 13 Cornell Int'l L.J. 145, 148 (1980).
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reporting of actions inconsistent with the rules. 43 The GATT has resolved
many disputes, despite the lack of remedies and sanctions similar to those
in domestic civil and criminal systems.' 44 There is, however, a pervasive
belief that the system needs to be more streamlined and formal. To bolster
the dispute mechanism, the United States and other countries have pushed
for a more legalistic dispute mechanism, one which involves shorter time
limits, excludes disputing parties from any decision in their case, and
provides more immediate and automatic imposition of sanctions. 145 On the
whole, if a stronger and more effective GATT is to become a reality,
contracting states must be prepared to cede certain sovereign rights to the
GATT.
2. A Flexible Institutional Arrangement
The GATT provides a flexible yet weak institutional structure for
remedying problems of international trade. The GATT is in essence a
contract between governments 146 that was created not as a permanent
organization, but rather as a provisional agreement among nations to
uphold principles of free trade. 147 As a result, the GATT remains a contract
supported by an extremely weak organizational infrastructure. 48 The
GATT's weakness in organizational structure, however, should not over-
shadow its practical successes due in large part to its flexibility. Although no
one would maintain that the GATT enjoyed a perfect record in dealing
with departures from its basic goals, it remains the only multinational
organization with any kind of track record in promoting the goals of free
trade. It also provides a unique forum through which one hundred nations
can consider ways to ease trade restrictions.
As compared with the international intellectual property treaties, the
GATT has provided a flexible institutional arrangement for participation
and a fluid mechanism for adopting new measures, principally because
GATT members have not formed rigid voting blocks as in other interna-
tional institutions. A good example of this institutional flexibility can be
143. Id. at 168-70.
144. See Waincyner, GATT Dispute Settlement: An Agenda for Evaluation and Reform, 14
N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 81, 92 (1989).
145. See Bliss, supra note 137, at 50. More specifically, a streamlined procedure would offer
the disputants mediation by the Director-General of the GATT. Arbitration also should be
offered as an alternative to the traditional panel process. Nongovernmental experts could be
used on the panels. Decisions of the contracting parties no longer would require an absolute
consensus. Expedited and enforceable deadlines would be established as well. A declaration
also should be issued so that the contracting parties will abide by these procedures. Id. at
50-52.
146. Id. at 53.
147. See generally Fisher, Making the World Trade Regime Work: An Agenda For GATT,
6 SAIS Rev 53 (1986) (advocating discussion of certain issues in the then upcoming round of
GATT negotiations).
148. In this regard, deficiencies in the decision-making procedures of the GATT system
have been pointed out: "The awkwardness of fragmented bodies, distributed among the
GATT and a variety of Codes and ancillary agreements leading to Balkanization .... Jackson,
Strengthening the International Legal Framework of the GATT-MTN System: Reform
Proposals far the New GATT Round, in The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: Legal and Economic Problems 18 (E.V. Petersman ed. 1988).
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found in nontariff barrier agreements embodied in codes to which adher-
ence is optional. Their success is derived from the GATT's institutional
flexibility. Maximum participation in the codes has been achieved through
the wide range of bargaining that takes place during GATT rounds.149
Despite its institutional flexibility, will a GATT solution undermine the
current international arrangements? More specifically, will the GATT be
able to work with the WIPO without a wasteful struggle for turf? Such a risk
exists. The GATT, however, has had a rich history of working with, rather
than displacing, other international organizations. For example, the GATT
traditionally has relied on experts in other areas for such tasks as admin-
istering codes on customs valuation and standards. Consequently, if a
GATT code on intellectual property were adopted, it would not replace the
multinational conventions, but would work in conjunction with other
international bodies. In this regard, the WIPO could be asked to lend its
expertise on matters of intellectual property protection. In sum, the
adoption of a GATT code would bolster rather than undermine interna-
tional institutions governing intellectual property.
E. Implementing a Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS) Agreement in the GATT
Several ,issues will have to be resolved before a GATE agreement
covering intellectual property can be accomplished. First, which institu-
tional mechanism should be used in amending the GATE? Second, which
substantive standards should be adopted? Third, should differential treat-
ment be given for certain developing countries? On each of these issues the
United States will have to adopt a more flexible bargaining stance.
The first issue is by which amendment mechanism the GATE should
institutionalize its recognition of intellectual property. The alternatives
range from formal and coercive mechanisms to a more flexible means. The
GATE formally recognizes only one method for amending its terms.
Although it has never been used, Article XXX(2) 150 constitutes the most
far-reaching institutional provision in amending the GATE. This provision
allows the contracting parties to adopt an amendment binding on all
members; those that do not accept it must withdraw from the GATT. Such
a coercive amendment procedure would be met with stiff opposition from
the developing world and should be avoided if a truly comprehensive
solution is to occur. A less coercive measure is found in Article XXX(1). 151
Under this provision, amendments to the GATT are binding on contract-
ing parties that accept them by a two-thirds majority. Even if a two-thirds
majority could be acquired under this procedure, most of the problem
countries probably would not vote for the measure. But if intellectual
property is incorporated into the GATE, it could form the basis by which
the developing world could join the rest of the world and the roughly sixty
nations who signed the amendment.
149. See H. Stalson, supra note 9, at 56-57.
150. See K. Simmonds & B. Hill, supra note 20, at I.A. 71-72.
151. See id. at 71.
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The 1979 Tokyo Round of the GATT developed a more flexible
means of amendment. During the Tokyo Round, the GATT membership
produced a series of agreements called "The Codes" that generally deal
with nontariff barriers. For example, the major codes are the Standards
Code, 52 the Customs Valuation Code,153 the Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties Code,'5 4 and the Revised Anti-Dumping Code. 5 5 The provisions of
the Codes apply only to the members who sign them and they set forth their
own dispute settlement mechanism' 56.
The most effective strategy regarding the TRIPS agreement would be
to take a middle approach. This would place a general provision in the basic
GATT agreement pursuant to the XXX(l) amendment process in conjunc-
tion with a specific intellectual property code. The general provision would
recognize the importance of adequately protecting intellectual property
and would emphasize that inadequate protection is a trade barrier. A
specific code would be drafted and signed by parties wishing to join. A
TRIPS agreement placed in the Code still would need a critical mass of
participants from both the developed and Third World countries to be truly
effective, but it could be the start of a movement toward world standards
concerning intellectual property. 57
F. Substantive Standards and Differential Treatment
Once the proper mechanism to amend the GATT is determined, the
next issues are who should develop the substantive standards and what
those standards should be. Developing a consensus on substantive stan-
dards may prove to be the most divisive and difficult issue to resolve in
forging an agreement.' 58 The difficulty lies in the basic discrepancy
between the developing countries and the United States as to what those
standards should be. The standards proposed by the United States are
unsurprisingly much like the U.S. law of trademark, patent, and
copyright. 5 9 These norms are clearly quite different from those in the
152. See id. at II.C.4 99-127.
153. See id. at II.C.3 53-59.
154. See id. at II.C.1 1-33.
155. See id. at II.C.2 33-53.
156. As a result, some commentators have argued that the separate dispute resolution
mechanism procedure will lead to balkanization and confusion, which ultimately will under-
mine the GATT dispute settlement process. See Bliss, supra note 137, at 41. The codes contain
the same jurisdictional requirement embodied in Article XXIII: to invoke the dispute
mechanism, a party to the code must allege nullification or impairment of benefits. See K.
Simmonds & B. Hill, supra note 20, at I.A. 55-56.
157. See Turnbull, supra note 136, at 18.
158. The U.S. proposal is reprinted in U.S. Intellectual Property Proposal is Proposed to
GATT Negotiating Group, 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 655 (Oct. 29, 1987).
159, The U.S. proposal contains the following provisions. Copyright standards should
contain, at a minimum, the standards of the Berne Convention. Adequate protection should
be extended to mask works, computer software, and sound recordings. Patent subject matter
should include chemicals, pharmaceutical products, and microorganisms. Compulsory licens-
ing and working requirements generally should be abrogated. Trademark protection should
be provided on the basis of use or registration. Rights should not lapse unless the trademark
has not been used for a period of time. Licensing should be freely permitted. Border and




The United States has provided a list of minimum substantive stan-
dards to be integrated into a TRIPS agreement. 160 In addition to the more
traditional aspects of intellectual property, new informational products
raise further problems. Particularly difficult standardization issues will
involve such new informational products as computer software, semicon-
ductors, and biotechnology. For example, many countries protect com-
puter software. Although there is a general consensus that software falls
into the domain of copyright, the consensus ends there. No general
agreement exists on how long the term of protection should last or the exact
substantive scope of protection. There is even less of a consensus on how to
treat semiconductor chips. A few countries, primarily the United States and
Japan, have adopted a sui generis protection for mask works. Although the
United States has tried to encourage other countries to do so, only a few
countries give protection to semiconductors. In this regard, the WIPO has
drafted several international proposals covering semiconductor chips, but
has not achieved the necessary consensus. 161 Biotechnology is another
general area which has posed many of the same issues, particularly as to the
scope of protection for living organisms.
An even more basic question is whether the GATT should establish its
own norms or whether it should look to those norms and standards set for
intellectual property protection by the prevailing international institutions.
This was a major point of contention at the Montreal meeting of the
Uruguay Round, which broke down into a North-South schism. The
developed countries would like to use the GATT as the standard-setting
mechanism for establishing the substantive rights to be determined. By
comparison, the developing countries would prefer leaving the substantive
standards to traditional international bodies such as the WIPO or
UNESCO.162 For these reasons, the goal of the West in the Uruguay Round
should be tempered by these difficult issues that will be resolved neither
quickly nor adequately unless the special needs of the developing countries
are taken into account.
ously maintained. See U.S. Proposal for Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 667 (Oct. 29, 1987).
160. See Turnbull, supra note 136, at 15; see also R. Benko, supra note 9, at 30-45.
161. Efforts to Adopt Integrated Circuit Treaty Suffer Set Back, 32 Pat. Trademark &
CopyrightJ. (BNA) 273-74 (July 24, 1986). The convention could not reach an agreement on
any matter, with the United States, Japan, and the European Community opposing the
developing countries. WIPO to Hold Meeting On Integrated Circuit Treaty, 33 Pat. Trade-
mark & Copyright J. (BNA) 625-26 (Apr. 9, 1981); 'Third World' Questions Need for
Integrated Circuits Treaty, 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 59-60 (May 21, 1987);
U.S., Japan Refuse to Sign WIPO Treaty on Protection of Semiconductor Chips, 38 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 123 (June 1, 1989). The United States and Japan refused
to sign, contending their laws provide more protection. The reasons for the US. refusal were
disagreements about the length of protection, determining when protection begins, and
dispute resolution. WIPO Draft Treaty on Chip Protection, 37 Pat. Trademark & Copyright
J. (BNA) 600-03 (Apr. 6, 1989).
162. India was the main advocate of such a position at the Montreal meeting. See GATT:
Indian Proposal Says Developing Countries Should Get Patent, Trademark Concessions, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 953 (July 19, 1989); see also Turnbull, supra'note 136, at 18.
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Related to the question of substantive standards is the issue of whether
differential treatment should be allowed for certain developing countries
and whether these countries should be allowed to be parties to a TRIPS
agreement without adopting all of its elements. 6 3 The current U.S.
bargaining position strictly denies differential treatment of the developing
countries. This approach will have to be modified if the United States and
other Western countries are to achieve an agreement that covers the
countries most responsible for the problem. The differing needs of the
developing countries must be recognized by forging a two-tier system that
accommodates their needs. This two-tier system should not be viewed as
permanent, but instead should include transitional periods within which
the developing countries could reasonably comply with the new standards
while avoiding the dislocations of a changing legal system.
G. Conclusion: Toward a New Multilateralism
Integrating intellectual property into the GATT system would consti-
tute a far-reaching step in promoting the adequate worldwide protection of
U.S. intellectual property. In itself, even if such an agreement is forged in
the current Uruguay Round of negotiations, it will not be a total solution to
the problem. The history of the GATT reveals that the developing
countries, which provide the least amount of intellectual property protec-
tion, exist largely outside the GAIT system. It will be difficult to include
intellectual property in a system that cannot deal with problems of
regionalism, state enterprises, and safeguard clauses. In addition, the
GATT officially has exempted from trade liberalization entire sectors, such
as agriculture and textiles, and has ignored deviations from free trade
principles in other industries, such as steel and textiles. This catalog of
GATT problems is well-known and indicates that folding an effective
intellectual property agreement into the GATT will flow neither smoothly
nor quicly.164
Including the developing countries in the GATT system will require a
less legalistic method than many are advocating at this time. As the GATT
negotiations have shown, the member nations may be unable to agree on
clear, precisely stated, enforceable substantive rules. The reason for this
inability is obvious. One need only consider the nature of the world trading
system, which is comprised of highly disparate units, varying widely in
political orientation, social organization, and stages of development. A
certain amount of differentiation in this environment will have to be
accepted. In effect, there will have to be a two-tier system that institution-
alizes lower levels of protection for the developing countries. This two-tier
163. See generally M. Camps & W. Diebold,Jr., The New Multilateralism 59-72 (1983) (need
for differential action).
164. The GATT itself only covers about 7% of world commerce. Major economic powers
such as the Soviet Union and China are not GATT members. Nor does the GATT address
capital flows, international investment, trade in services, and exchange rates. In addition,
certain other practices that arguably distort trade) such as voluntary restraint agreements and
variable levies, are excluded under the GATT. Trade in textiles and agricultural products also
exists outside of the GATT framework. See Choate & Lyner, Tailored Trade: Dealing with the
World as It Is, 88 Harv. Bus. Rev. 86 (Jan.-Feb. 1988).
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system also must contain transitional provisions that consider the disloca-
tions of the new substantive standards. If worldwide substantive standards
are to be established, they will evolve through a system phased in over a
number of years. A system that does not take into account the differing
cultural, economic, and moral aspirations of the developing countries will
be doomed to failure and will not be enforced effectively by those countries
on which it is imposed. It is, therefore, an illusion to believe that an
organization like the GATT can incorporate tightly drafted substantive
rules to be applied immediately. At best, progress will take place slowly, and
the United States and other Western countries may have to subsidize
heavily the developing countries in their attempts to establish a govern-
mental infrastructure to administer a system of intellectual property rights.
For the immediate future, however, there may be limited areas of
agreement, such as establishing an anticounterfeiting code similar to the
one almost passed during the Tokyo Round. In addition, there also may be
agreement on certain kinds of situations that must be kept under multilat-
eral surveillance, and on procedures that may be established so that
complaints can be investigated. But apart from these measured steps, an
international consensus and effective agreement will evolve, if at all, over a
long period of time.
The evolution of the world trading system will not occur smoothly, nor
will it develop in a way that will meet the demands of all intellectual
property owners. The current proliferation of industry reports and gov-
ernmental position paperg, which divide the world into producers and
creators versus parasites and pirates, should not be taken literally if a
long-term, stable solution to the problem is sought. In addition, the
unequivocal list of advantages of strong protection for intellectual property
in the developing world should be regarded as a self-serving justification
for a legal regime based on the interests of the information producing
world. Moreover, the United States must acknowledge that persuading the
developing countries to enter into an intellectual property code will come at
a price. The developing countries will demand a quid pro quo for any
drastic changes in their substantive law and enforcement practices. The
United States and other Western countries will have to provide special trade
concessions and debt reduction, as well as direct subsidies, to expedite the
process.165
Establishing an intellectual property code for the GATT will be a
challenging task, but one that must be accomplished. Failure to forge an
agreement will provide a justification for overly intense bilateral efforts
which, in the long run, are not in the U.S. interest in supporting free trade.
The opposite extreme also must be avoided: forcing on the Third World a
TRIPS agreement that does not reflect its economic and cultural realities.
Instead, the Western approach should be gradual, integrating the devel-
165. Tying trade concessions and debt reduction to enhanced intellectual property protec-
tion already has been considered in the U.S.-Mexico trade talks. These bilateral talks involved
the resolution of problems concerning the protection of U.S. intellectual property. See Steel
Trade, Intellectual Property Rights Top Agenda Items for U.S.-Mexico Discussions, 6 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1045 (Aug. 9, 1989).
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oping countries through negotiation in limited areas of agreement. 166 Only
through this patient effort will a fruitful new multilateralism be established
in which all the participants will benefit.
Meanwhile, the United States must continue to enhance its own
domestic intellectual property law protection, and it also must continue to
harmonize this law with the recognized world consensus on the substantive
rules of intellectual property law. In addition, a measured and careful
bilateralism can be useful in encouraging the problem countries toward
recognized world standards of protection. The traditional international
agreements and institutions also must be strengthened and extended to
protect areas of intellectual property law that until now have not been
recognized in the world arena. The United States must act in a balanced
manner on all these fronts. This, in itself, will encourage an eventual
multilateral solution.
166. A middle-of-the-road consensus on a TRIPS agreement may be developing. On
September 12, 1989, India declared that it had accepted the principle of policing TRIPS
within the framework of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations. Until then, India
had systematically refused to accept that the GATT had this responsibility rather than the
WIPO. India, however, made the distinction between enforcement at the frontier and internal
enforcemem, insisting that the latter had nothing to do with international trade and was
therefore not a GATT concern. See India Accepts Principle of Policing Trade-Related
Intellectual Property, 3 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 244-45 (1989).
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